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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of corporate governance on financial
performance by cement firms listed in Saudi stock market during the period of 20122016. Many studies have examined the association between corporate governance
mechanisms, ownership structure and firm performance, the most of them conducted in
the developed countries, produced diverse findings, influenced by the nature of the
dominant governance system for each country. Using the Least Ordinary Square (OLS),
the results of the current study revealed that managerial ownership and firm size have a
positive and significant impact on firm performance. However, board independence,
board size, board meeting and audit type have no effect on the financial performance.
Keywords: corporate governance, board structure, ownership structure, performance,
Saudi Arabia.

ﻣﻠﺨﺺ
ﺗﺒﺤﺚ ﻫﺬه اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ ﺣﻮﻛﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎت ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷداء اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻲ ﻟﺸـﺮﻛﺎت اﻻﺳـﻤﻨﺖ اﻟﺴـﻌﻮدﻳﺔ اﻟﻤﺪرﺟـﺔ
 درﺳـﺖ اﻟﻌﻼﻗـﺔ ﺑـﻴﻦ آﻟﻴـﺎت ﺣﻮﻛﻤـﺔ، ﻣﻌﻈﻤﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﻠﺪان اﻟﻤﺘﻘﺪﻣـﺔ، ﻋﺪة دراﺳﺎت.2016-2012 ﺧﻼل اﻟﻔﺘﺮة
 ﺗﻠــﻚ اﻟﺪراﺳــﺎت اﺳــﻔﺮت ﻋــﻦ ﻧﺘــﺎﺋﺞ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔــﺔ ﺗــﺄﺛﺮت ﺑﻄﺒﻴﻌــﺔ ﻧﻈــﺎم.اﻟﺸــﺮﻛﺎت وﻫﻴﻜــﻞ اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴــﺔ وأداء اﻟﺸــﺮﻛﺔ
 أﻇﻬﺮت ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ اﻟﺤﺎﻟﻴﺔ أن اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ اﻹدارﻳﺔ، ﺑﺎﺳﺘﺨﺪام اﻻﻧﺤﺪار اﻟﺨﻄﻲ اﻟﻤﺘﻌﺪد.اﻟﺤﻮﻛﻤﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻛﻞ ﺑﻠﺪ
.وﺣﺠﻢ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ ﻟﻬﻤﺎ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ ذو دﻻﻟﺔ إﺣﺼـﺎﺋﻴﺔ ﻋﻠـﻰ أداء ﺷـﺮﻛﺎت اﻻﺳـﻤﻨﺖ اﻟﻤﺪرﺟـﺔ ﺑﺴـﻮق اﻟﻤـﺎل اﻟﺴـﻌﻮدﻳﺔ
 ﺣﺠـﻢ، اﺳـﺘﻘﻼل ﻣﺠﻠـﺲ اﻹدارة:ﻓﻲ ﺣﻴﻦ ﺗﻮﺻﻠﺖ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ اﻟﻰ ﻋﺪم وﺟﻮد ﻋﻼﻗﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻷداء اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻲ وﻛﻼً ﻣـﻦ
. وﻧﻮع ﻣﻜﺘﺐ اﻟﻤﺮاﺟﻌﺔ، ﻋﺪد اﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﺎت ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻹدارة،ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻹدارة

 All rights reserved to Jerash University 2019.
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Introduction
Nowadays, corporate governance has become a priority for the economic
growth of any nation (Bansal & Sharma, 2016). It has become a concern in
developing economies since the financial scandals in the past, which have
resulted in demands for improved corporate governance practices (Baydoun et
al., 2013). In fact, good corporate governance has become essential for
improving firm performance, ensuring investor rights, enhancing the investment
atmosphere and encouraging economic development (Braga-Alves & Shastri,
2011; Price, Roman & Rountree, 2011).
Good corporate governance also enables management to recognize
corporate objectives, meet legal requirements, and protect shareholder rights.
The impact of internal corporate governance on the performance of Saudi listed
Cement firms is worthy of study for several reasons. Firstly, Saudi Stock
Exchange is the 24th largest exchange out of the 76 stock exchanges worldwide,
and the Saudi Stock Exchange's Market Capitalization is $442.46 Billion
adjusted US Dollars as of March 2017; therefore, evaluating Saudi market
performance and variables affecting this performance are important to investors.
Secondly, since the launching of Saudi Corporate Governance Code in the
late 2006, there has been no study investigated the relationship between firm
performance and internal corporate governance of Saudi listed Cement firms.
Thirdly, the results of this study about the impact of internal corporate
governance on firm performance may help potential investors to grasp the
importance of good corporate governance practices in protecting their interests.
Finally, the study may add to the existing body of literature of corporate
governance and contribute particularly to a better understanding of the potential
components of internal corporate governance in the Saudi context.
Accurately, the present paper studies the determinant of firm performance
and provides additional evidence on the influence of internal corporate
governance on firm performance in the Saudi context where corporate
governance is still in the early stage. This paper found that managerial
ownership has a significant positive impact on the financial performance among
Saudi cement firms listed in stock market, other corporate governance factors
such as board independence, board size, and board meeting are not related to the
financial performance. The reminder of this present study proceeds as follows.
The following section provides a detailed discussion concerning the literature
review and hypotheses development. Following a discussion on the
methodology, the results of the study are reported. The final section concludes
the research.
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Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Corporate Governance
The Cadbury Report (1992) defines corporate governance as the system by
which companies are directed and controlled. This report claims that the duty for
corporate governance lies with the board of directors whom appointed by
shareholders to ensure that a proper governance structure is in place. The
responsibilities of the board include setting the company’s strategic aims,
providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of
the business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The board’s
actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting.
OECD (2004) suggests corporate governance engages a set of relationships
between management, boards, shareholders and other stakeholders of the firm.
Based on this definition, the corporate governance framework should ensure the
strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by
the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders.
Moreover, the board is not only responsible to the company and its shareholders
but also has a duty to act in their best interests and expected to take due regard
of, and deal fairly with, other stakeholder interests such as employees, creditors,
customers, suppliers and community. In order for boards to effectively fulfill
their responsibilities, they must be able to exercise objective and independent
judgment.
Furthermore, Saudi Capital Market Authority (SCMA, 2017) defines the
corporate governance as rules to lead and guide the Company that includes
mechanisms to regulate the various relationships between the Board, Executive
Directors, shareholders and Stakeholders, by establishing rules and procedures to
facilitate the decision making process and add transparency and credibility to it
with the objective of protecting the rights of shareholders and Stakeholders and
achieving fairness, competitiveness and transparency on the Exchange and the
business environment. The main objective of this study is to examine the impact
of corporate governance on financial performance among Saudi cement
companies. Board independence, board size, board meeting, and managerial
ownership are utilized to measure corporate governance in the current study.
Financial Performance and Board Independence
According to (Habbash & Bajaher, 2015) agency theory assumes the more
mix between inside and outside directors sitting in the bored; the more
effectiveness of a board and better performance. The corporate governance
codes issued by Saudi Capital Market Authority (2017) imposed on all listed
699
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companies including the cement companies that the composition of the board
must include independent members’ not less one-third of the members.
Empirical studies regarding the association between the board independence
and financial performance found inconclusive results. Some studies found a
positive and significant relationship between the board independence and
financial performance (Palaniappan, 2017; Habbash & Bajaher, 2015; Vintila &
Gherghina, 2012; Nuryanah & Islam, 2011). Others, however, found a negative
relationship between outside directors and firm performance (E.g. Sheikh,
Wang, & Khan, 2013; Shukeri, Shin & Shaari, 2012, Bhagat & Bolton, 2008;
Abdullah, 2006; Klein, Shapiro & Young, 2005). Other researchers have shown
no evidence of a significant relationship with performance (Habbash 2017;
Sheikh et al., 2013; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Kula, 2005). Owing to the mixed
findings documented in previous researches, the hypotheses are stated below in
the form of a positive relationship as the agency theory assumes the more mix
between inside -and outside directors sitting in the bored; the more effectiveness
of a board and better performance accordingly.
H1: There is a significant positive association between the board independence
and financial performance.
Financial Performance and Board Size
It is argued that the agency problems associated with larger boards is more
higher compare to small boards ones (Habbash & Bajaher, 2015). In fact, the
board of directors leads and controls a company and an effective board is
fundamental to the success of a company. Lipton & Lorsch (1992) suggest that
larger boards are less effective than smaller boards because some directors may
free-ride on the efforts of others. Similarly, Jensen (1993) states that when
boards get larger, they are less likely to function effectively.
Alternatively, resource dependence theory suggests that larger boards with
high levels of links to the external environment improve the company’s access to
various resources and leads to better performance (Sheikh et al., 2013). Several
studies have been done in this area. For example, Sheikh et al., (2013) and
Jackling & Johl (2009) found a positive relationship between board size and
financial performance, which is consistent with the predictions of the resource
dependence theory.
However, Shukeri, et al., (2012) found a negative association between
company performance and board size. Finally, Nuryanah & Islam (2011) found
no association between board size and performance proxies. From the abovementioned discussion, there is a mixed result with respect to the association
700
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between board size and company performance. Therefore, the study examines
this relationship based on the following hypothesis:
H2: There is a significant positive association between board size and financial
performance.
Financial Performance and Board Meetings
Board meetings is considered one of the important factors of corporate
governance. Lipton & Lorsch (1992) assert that board members have insufficient
time to achieve their duties and board meetings enhance the effectiveness of
board. A higher frequency of board meeting could result to directors in carrying
out their duties in line with shareholders' expectations and monitor management
more efficiently (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992).
Regarding empirical studies, there is a mixed result. Some studies found a
positive and significant relationship between number of board meetings and
firm’s financial performance (Palaniappan, 2017; García-Ramos & GarcíaOlalla, 2011). On the other hand, Rodriguez Fernandez et al. (2014) reported
negative relationship between number of board meetings and firm’s financial
performance. Jackling & Johl (2009) found no association between board
meetings and firm’s financial performance. Based on these views, the current
study hypothesized that:
H3: There is a significant positive association between board meetings and
financial performance.
Financial Performance and Managerial Ownership
According to Jensen & Meckling (1976), the greater the percentage of
stocks owned by top managers, the more likely they will make decisions
consistent with maximizing stockholders' wealth since that will maximize their
own wealth. Therefore, managerial ownership serves as an important means of
controlling agency problems.
Researchers have studies the relationships between the managerial
ownership and performance in different countries. Drakos & Bekiris (2010)
provided evidence that managerial ownership has a positive impact on corporate
performance. On the other hand, Ehikioya (2009) has shown that managerial
ownership is negatively related to the return on assets. Further, Mousa (2010)
found no statistically significant relation between managerial ownership and
corporate performance. Hence, based on the above arguments, the present study
hypothesized that:
H4: There is a significant positive association between managerial ownership
and financial performance.
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Methodology
Research Design
This study was relying on quantitative design. Statistical analysis, table or
graph was typically applied in this study. The evaluation and assessment of the
firm performance was according to the data gathered from the company’s’
annual report.
Sample selection and Data Collection
This research is limited to the listed cement firms in Saudi stock market,
covering the period from 2012 to 2016. There were 14 cement firms listed in
Saudi stock market. After excluding one firm that have incomplete data, the total
sample of study becomes 13 cement firms with 65 observations. The purpose of
this study is to examine the influence of internal corporate governance
(independent variables) on financial performance (dependent variable) for listed
cement firms in Saudi stock market. Secondary source is used to collect required
data. In fact, all the data of dependent variable and independent variables are
manually collected from the annual reports of the sampled firms for the period of
study.
Data Analysis
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to assess and
analyze the collected data to examine the relationship between corporate
governance variables and firm performance. There are two methods of analysis
used in this study, which are descriptive and inferential Statistics analysis. These
methods were used as the underlying statistical tests to describe the original
characteristics of a data set and are the key to summarizing variables, examining
the impact of independent variables on dependent variable. The following model
will be used to test the study's hypotheses:
FPERit = α0 + α1BINDit + α2BSIZEit + α3BMTGit + α4MOWNit +
α5FSIZEit + α6AUTYit + e
where,


FPER the company financial performance indicator which is represented by
the Return On Assets as the main dependent variable of the study for firm
(i) and period (t).




BIND represents Board Independence for firm (i) and period (t).
BSIZE represents Board Size of firm (i) and of period (t).




BMTG represents Board Meeting of firm (i) and for period (t).
MOWN represents Managerial Ownership of firm (i) and for period (t).
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FSIZE represents natural logarithm of Total Asset



AUTY represents a dummy variable for Audit Type of the company, 1 if the
firm audited by one of the big4, 0 otherwise



e represents error term.

Measurement of Variables
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable of this study is the firm’s financial performance. To
measure this variable, the study uses Return on Assets (ROA). According to
Habbash & Bajaher (2015) ROA is one of the best performance measures used
to address the relationship with corporate governance. Therefore, the study uses
ROA to find out the relationship of this measure with independent variables.
Likewise, Habbash & Bajaher (2015), the study measures ROA as a percentage
of profit before interest and tax divided by total assets.
Independent Variables
Independent variables of this study are corporate governance variables,
namely; board independence, board size, board meeting, and managerial
ownership. The measure of these variables in this study is based on earlier
corporate governance studies. Table1 shows the measurement of independent
variables used in this study.
Control Variables
Beside the dependent and independent variables, some firm specific
characteristics such as firm size) and audit size are used as control variables in
this study (Table1 shows the definitions of these two variables). The using of
these variables as control variables is due to their impact as firm specific
characteristics on firms’ performance.
Table 1: Measurement of Variables
Variable
Financial performance(FPER)
Board independence (BIND)
Board size(BSIZE)
Board meetings (BMTG)
Managerial ownership(MOWN)
Firm size (FSIZE)
Audit type (AUTY)

Measurement
The percentage of profit before interest and tax
divided by total assets
The percentage of independent directors to total
directors on the board
Number of directors sitting on the board
Number of meetings held by the board in the year
The percentage of number of shares hold by directors
and executive's managers to the total shares.
Log of total assets
1 if the firm audited by one of the big4, 0 otherwise
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Results
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for all dichotomous and continuous variables are
provided in Table2. Table2 shows that the highest performance of sampled
companies is 0.33% and the minimum performance as measured by ROA is
0.00% with a mean of 13.3%. Furthermore, the present study found that the
cement firms listed in Saudi stock market comply with corporate governance
requirements regarding the board independence. It found that 0.51% of such
companies are independent directors. This is in line with the guidelines of Saudi
Governance Code that proposed that the composition of the board must be not
less than one-third of the members.
Another interested finding of this paper is the board size has a mean of 8.7%
and ranges from 6 to 11. This finding is in line of the Saudi corporate
governance codes, which stated that the listed firms must have directors not less
than 3 and not more than 11. The same table also shows that, on average,
companies meets five times a year. Companies are also found to have
managerial ownership on average about 19%. Descriptive statistics for other
control variables (firm size and audit type) are also shown in Table2.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
N
MINIMAM
FPER
65
.00
BIND
65
.00
BSIZE
65
5.00
BMTG
65
2.00
MOWN
65
.00
FSIZE
65
9.05
AUTY
65
.00

MAXIMAM
.33
.86
11.00
13.00
.70
9.67
1.00

MEAN
.1331
.5106
8.7846
5.2462
.1964
9.4458
.5538

SD
.08230
.16172
1.74546
2.09934
.17683
.16322
.50096

Bivariate Correlations
Table 3 reports Pearson product-moment correlations among all variables.
The purpose of this test to see whether there is multicollinearity between
independent variables, which represents by high correlation between any two
variables. According to Lind, Marchal, & Wathen (2012) highly correlated
independent variables make it difficult to make inference about the individual
regression coefficients and their individual effects on dependent variables. A
critical value that represents the high correlation between two variables is
between -0.70 and 0.70 if less, multicollinearity between variables does not exist
(Lind et al., 2012).
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As indicated in Table3, the correlation among variables is between -0.27
and 0.54. The higher level of correlation found is between managerial ownership
and financial performance as dependent variable which is 0.54 which is found to
be significant at 0.01 level. This indicates that managerial ownership and
financial performance has a strong positive and significant association among
cement firms in Saudi listed stock market. The findings are in line with Drakos
& Bekiris (2010). However, Mousa (2010) reported no significant association
between managerial ownership and financial performance.
Table 3: Correlations Coefficients
FPER BIND BSIZE BMTG MOWN FSISE AUTY
FPER
1
BIND -.1921
BSIZE .414** -.1401
BMTG .276* -.270-* -.2371
MOWN .546** .020
.255* .359**
1
FSISE .378** -.212- .349* * .246*
-.0161
AUTY .102
-.170.139
.151
.105
.028
1
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at
the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The multicollinearity problems are checked through correlation matrix. The
higher level of correlation among independent variables is 0.35 between
managerial ownership and board meetings. By comparing the findings in table3
with level (0.70) of multicollinearity suggested by Lind et al., (2012), it can be
concluded that the serious multicollinearity is not exist among independent
variables.
Furthermore, the existence of multicollinearity is tested by calculated the
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). According to Gujarati & Porter (2009), VIF
value of less than 10 shows there is no multicollinearity problem. The VIF's for
all individual variables were also very low supporting the previous conclusion
that independent variables included in the model are not substantially correlated
with each other. The results of the VIF and Tolerance test during multiple
regression analysis are shown in Table 4.
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Table4: Regression Results
Unstandardized
Model
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
(Constant)
.009
.143

Stand. Coef.

T-value

Sig.

0.061

0. 951

BIND

-.103-

.104

-0.103-

-0.996-

0.323

BSIZE

.188

.128

0.188

1.465

0.148

BMTG

.049

.132

0.049

0.370

0.713

MOWN

.488

.118

0.488

4.116

0.000

FSIZE

.286

.115

0.286

2.488

0.016

AUTY

-.016-

.196

-0.008-

-0.081-

0.936

Adj. R
F-value:
Square 0..432 9.098

VIF

Beta

Durbin-Watson: 1.807

1.210
1.855
1.968
1.581
1.489
1.082
1.210
1.855
1.968
1.581
1.489
1.082
1.210
1.855
1.968
1.581
1.489
1.082

sig F:0.00

Regression Results
The main objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between the
internal corporate governance as independent variables and profitability as
dependent variable. To achieve this objective, the multivariate analysis was run.
In fact, Ordinary Lease Square analysis (OLS) is used to test the hypothesis.
OLS regression is a powerful technique especially when the model contains
continuous and dummy variables (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999).
The findings of regression analysis is shown in Table4. As indicated in
Table4, the
F-value of the model is highly significant at the 1 percent level and the
adjusted R-squared is 43%. Thus, it can be concluded that the independent
variables explain (47%) of the variability in financial performance of Saudi
cement listed firms. This value is higher than adjusted R-squared obtained by
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Habbash & Bajaher, (2015) and Cheng (2008) who reported only 17% and 28%
respectively.
AS shown in Table4, board independence is negatively, related to the
financial performance, but the relationship is insignificant. This finding is
opposite to H1, which predict a significant positive association between financial
performance and board independence. However, the result is line with such prior
studies performance (Habbash 2017; Sheikh et al., 2013; Haniffa & Hudaib,
2006). However, the results contradict the agency theory argument that the
presence of independent directors improves firm performance. Such a
contradiction stems from the lack of business knowledge and the lack of true
independence as large shareholders are the only ones responsible for appointing
independent directors (Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, 2013).
In the board size, the finding reported insignificant positive association with
firm performance. Hence, H2 cannot be accepted. In fact, the results indicate
that larger boards are ineffective in enhancing financial performance. The lack
of association between large boards and financial performance is similar to
Habbash & Bajaher, (2015) and Nuryanah & Islam (2011). Another finding of
the current study is a positive relationship between firm financial performance
and board meetings, but not significance. Thereby, H3 is rejected. This finding is
in line with Jackling & Johl (2009). However, this result is in contrast with result
of studies done by Palaniappan, (2017) and García-Ramos & GarcíaOlalla,
(2011).
Regarding the fourth hypothesis which predicts significant positive
association between the financial performance and managerial ownership. The
finding reported a significant positive relationship between the financial
performance and managerial ownership. Therefore, H4 is accepted. This result is
in line with results of study conducted by Drakos & Bekiris (2010), they found
that managerial ownership is related to financial performance. In contrast,
Mousa (2010) found no statistically significant relation between managerial
ownership and financial performance.
For control variables, in terms of firm size, the result reported a significant
positive relationship between the financial performance and firm size. The larger
firms the more investment they have and leading to better performance. The
results consistent with the findings of Ehikioya (2009) and Habbash & Bajaher
(2015). On the other hand, the current study found a negative association
between the financial performance and audit type but no significance. This
result, however, is in contrast of findings of Habbash & Bajaher (2015).
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Conclusion
This study explores the impact of corporate governance on the financial
performance of cement companies listed in Saudi stock market during the period
of 2012-2016. Empirical studies indicate that managerial ownership has
significant positive affect on the financial performance. Board independence is
found to be not related to the financial performance among Saudi listed cement
companies. However, the results contradict the agency theory argument that the
presence of independent directors improves firm performance.
Further, board size and board meetings appear to be insignificant
association to the financial performance. Board meetings appear to be
insignificant related to the financial performance. With respect to the control
variables, the finding demonstrates that firm size has a significant positive
impact on the financial performance. However, audit type has no impact on the
financial performance.
Limitations and Future Research
Like all studies the present study has some limitations that need to be
acknowledged and addressed when assessing the findings of the study. First, the
data was collected through publicly available data sources such as annual reports
and other databases. Other data could be helpful to gain more of an insight.
Second, while the study focuses only on a limited number of corporate
governance variables (four variables), this study opens avenues for future
research by considering the impact of corporate governance using other
variables such as competence of the directors, CEO tenure, and directors’
qualifications for several years. Moreover, there is a room for further research to
compare the firm performance before and after the adoption of new governance
code to see whether this adoption makes any change in Saudi firms’
performance.
Third, the sample size is small. In fact, this study has only covered the
period from 2012 to 2016, with a sample of 13 firms out of Saudi listed firms;
hence, the validity of the findings interpreted in this study is limited to the scope
of the data and the condition of economics for the period of the data. For future
research, the sample size could be increased by including a longer period and
different sectors or different countries such as members of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC).
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